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Abstract 
Among different definitions about Pragmatics as a science, the 
following two were chosen on purpose. Pragmatics is the study of 
speaker meaning, (Yule, 1996). Pragmalinguistics refers to the 
resources for conveying communicative acts and relational or 
interpersonal meanings, (Leech, 1983). 
This paper focuses on speech acts as crucial aspect of pragmatics. 
The main idea of the paper is to highlight the correlation between 
teaching speech acts and developing pragmatic competence of EFL 
students through classroom activities. As House (1996) stated, 
bringing together the ability to carry out speech acts and manage 
ongoing conversation, benefited instructional effects on pragmatic 
fluency - the extent to which students' conversational contributions 
are relevant, polite, and overall effective.  
Given the explanation of all types of speech acts, students gain 
additional skills on expressing promises, requests, apologies, 
emotional and psychological states etc. These skills might be evident 
on their correct usage and understanding of language in contexts, 
clearly stated on the usage of mitigating devices, opening and 
closing remarks, discourse markers, apologetic formulae, 
intensifiers etc.  
Keywords: speech acts, pragmatic competence, language 
awareness, types of speech acts, implicature. 
 
Introduction 
Due to historical, geographical, political, social (and many other) reasons, 
English language is nowadays widespread around the world. It has been 
interwoven with various aspects of people’s lives. Meanwhile, 
communication has always been a necessity of human beings; and English 
language serves well to this purpose.  
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This paper is framed in English language teaching and learning, under the 
umbrella of pragmatics. The aim of the paper is to highlight the importance 
of teaching pragmatics and teaching English simultaneously. Raising 
students’ language awareness can be done through pragmatic competence. 
Such competence is developed in children since early ages, as far as first 
language acquisition is concerned. When it comes to learning a second or 
foreign language, things do not seem that easy. Many psychologists stated 
their theories concerning SLA, which were a great help for methodologists 
in improving the FL teaching approaches and techniques. 
Pragmatic competence is being considered as playing an important role in 
teaching and learning a foreign language. One of the various definitions of 
Pragmatics is: “Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning”, (Yule, 
1996:3). He further explains that pragmatics is concerned with the study of 
meaning as communicated by a speaker and interpreted by a listener; it has 
to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what 
the words or phrases in those utterances might mean for themselves. One 
of the basic theories of Pragmatics is Speech Act Theory, which is also the 
focal point of this paper.  
 
Speech Act Theory 
It all started with John Austin. In his manuscript How to Do Things with 
Words (1962:7), he wrote the following:  
“To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words 'I 
name, this...'. When I say, before the registrar or altar, 'I do', I am not 
reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it… What are we to call a 
sentence or an utterance of this type? I propose to call it a perfornative 
sentence or a performative utterance, or, for short, 'a performative'… The 
name is derived, of course, from 'perform', the usual verb with the noun 
'action': it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an 
action -it is not normally thought of as just saying something.” 
Austin’s intention above was to distinguish a statement from an utterance. 
He went further in his theory by classifying utterances into performatives 
and constatives ones. The main tenet was that speaking is acting and 
actions performed via utterances are called speech acts. Austin declared 
that different from constatives, performative utterances cannot be 
considered true or false, (the use of hereby in the utterance was linked to 
time and circumstances of the event, such as: I hereby promise…). 
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Not to speak of truth or falsity of performatives, Austin introduced the term 
felicity conditions. Austin (1962:14) suggested three categories of 
conditions which must be satisfied for a performative act to be felicitous, 
which he termed Felicity Conditions: 
a. There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional 
effect. The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as 
specified in the procedure. 
b. The procedure must be executed correctly and completely.  
c. The persons must have the requisite thoughts, feeling and 
intentions, as specified in the procedure and if consequent conduct 
is specified, then the relevant parties must so do. 
Austin (1962:16) pointed out that the violations of the first two conditions 
result in what he calls misfires, when the intended action is not performed; 
whereas violations of the third conditions are only abuses, when the action 
is preformed but infelicitously or insincerely. Some of these conditions are 
verbal, they have to do with the uttering of certain conventional words; 
others are non-verbal, they have to do with the conventional procedure and 
the appropriate participants etc. 
Working on performatives, Austin (1962:22-25) found out that the 
performative category covers a wide range of utterances, subsuming some 
which are not of the highly conventionalized type, but are used in ordinary 
language situations. Thus the uttering of the following sentences could also 
constitute the performing of the acts that are depicted by their performative 
verbs, i.e. promising and warning. 
I promise that I shall be there. 
I warn you that there is a bull in the field. 
 
Austin drew a parallel distinction between explicit performatives which 
satisfy the linguistic form in the above sentences or others of this model, 
and implicit performatives which do not conform to that form although it 
is assumed and implicit, such as: 
I shall be there.  
There is a bull in the field. 
 
The logical assumption above can generally apply to sentence-types which 
are common almost in every language; namely, the imperative, the 
interrogative and the declarative. Thus, we can assume that the imperative 
contains the performative verb (I order you to…), the interrogative (I ask 
you whether…), and the declarative (I state to you that…). These are 
implicit performatives. However, constatives can be considered 
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performatives this way, to utter "I state to you that…" is also to perform an 
act: that of stating. 
 
Three dimensions of Speech Acts 
The main idea of Austin’s theory was saying by doing, we do things with 
words. Austin preceded his theory with the proposal that there are three 
dimensions in a speech act. Austin (1962:100-102) suggested that a 
speaker can simultaneously perform three acts in issuing an utterance: the 
locutionary act is the act of saying something with a certain sense and 
reference; the illocutionary act is the act performed in saying something, 
i.e. the act named and identified by the explicit performative verb. The 
perlocutionary act is the act performed by, or as a consequence of, saying 
something.  
He gave the following example: Shoot her! 
Locution: He said to me ' Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring 
by 'her ' to her. 
Illocution: He urged (or advised, ordered, etc.) me to shoot her. 
Perlocution: He persuaded me to shoot her. He got me to (or made me) 
shoot her. 
Yule (1996:48) comments on the three acts by saying that if one has 
difficulty in with forming the sounds and words to create a meaningful 
utterance, then one might fail to produce a locutionary act. If one 
understands the meaning of an utterance, but one does not understand the 
function of it, it means they failed to produce the illocutionary act. 
On the three dimensions, the illocutionary act is the most discussed. The 
illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance. 
Illocution is the force of an utterance; it states what is meant by what is 
said. Yule (1996:49) brings up a point; the illocutionary force of an 
utterance is what it counts as. In the example:  I’ll see you later. (A) 
Locution A can counts as more than one illocution: I predict that A – it 
counts as a prediction; I promise you that A – it counts as a promise; I warn 
you that A – it counts as a warning. 
Thus, the same utterance can potentially have different illocutionary 
forces. How can speakers assume that the intended illocutionary force will 
be recognized by the hearer? 
The most obvious device for indicating the illocutionary force (IFID) is an 
expression of the type I Vp you that…where there is a slot for a verb that 
explicitly names the illocutionary act being performed. (Vp is the 
performative verb). Yule (1996:49) 
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Towards the end of his book, Austin (1962:148 -164.) attempts a 
classification of illocutionary verbs using the explicit performative test and 
a concise dictionary. After a detailed survey of cases, conditions and 
examples, Austin proposes the following five general types of speech acts. 
Major parts of Austin’s lectures on speech acts address the question under 
what circumstances a locutionary act will successfully and irrevocably 
cause an illocutionary act.  
i. verdictives (type assertion) 
ii. exercitives (type I urge you to do something) 
iii. commissives (type I promise to do something) 
iv. behabitives (all other social agreements) 
v. expositives (expressing emotion) 
 
Searle’s development of Speech Act Theory 
Austin's early death left many questions hovering and doubts and 
discussions rising. Searle (1969) developed the theory to render it more 
systematic. He chooses to drop the separation of an utterance into 
locutionary and illoculionary acts and adopt a distinction between a 
proposition or propositional act and illocutionary force indicating devices 
(IFID), which mark the illocutionary force. These include the mood of the 
verb or the main sentence-types, intonation contours, explicit 
performatives …etc. Searle (1965:42) suggests that all five utterances in 
express the same proposition: i.e. predicating the act of leaving the room 
though each of them can characteristically be used to perform a different 
illocutionary act of John: 
 
(a) Will John leave the room? 
(b) John will leave the room. 
(c) John leave the room! 
(d) Would that John left the room. 
(e) If John will leave the room, I will leave also. 
 
A proposition is distinct from an assertion or the statement of that 
proposition. The proposition that John will leave the room is expressed in 
the utterance of all the sentences above, but only in the second one is that 
proposition asserted.  
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Searle claimed that there are exactly five illocutionary points. He listed 
them and added examples that are classed under the respective 
illocutionary point in S+V (Searle, 1965:179 – 190). 
 Assertives (assert, claim, affirm, state, deny, disclaim, assure, 
argue, rebut, inform, notify, remind, object, predict, report, suggest 
insist, conjecture, hypothesize, guess, swear, testify, admit, 
confess, accuse, blame, criticize, praise, complain, boast, lament) 
 Commissives (commit, promise, threaten, vow, pledge, swear, 
accept, consent, refuse, offer, bid, assure, guarantee, warrant, 
contract, covenant, bet) 
 Directives (direct, request, ask1, ask2, urge, tell, require, demand, 
command, order, forbid, prohibit, enjoin, permit, suggest, insist, 
warn, advise, recommend, beg, suplicate, entreat, beseech, 
implore, pray) 
 Declaratives (declare, resign, adjourn, appoint, nominate, approve, 
confirm, disapprove, endorse, renounce, disclaim, denounce, 
repudiate, bless, curse, excommunicate, consecrate, christen, 
abbreviate, name, call) 
 Expressives (apologize, thank, condole, congratulate, complain, 
lament, protest, deplore, boast, compliment, praise, welcome, 
greet) 
 
Austin’s theory started with the essential distinction of performatives and 
constatives. Being a member of the School of Oxford, Austin followed the 
ordinary language philosophy, where he stated that uttering is performing, 
in other words uttering is acting out the truth value of the words being 
uttered. However, Austin’s theory on truth value of propositions raised 
strong debates especially in an era of ‘modern Pragmatics’. 
According to Ambroise (2010:4), Austin's theory of speech acts is a radical 
conventionalist account of speech highlighting the ritual practices to which 
speaking contributes and revealing two specific acts (illocutionary and 
perlocutionary) that arise in linguistic exchanges. This way, it reveals the 
revolutionary fact that speaking does change the course of events.  
Meanwhile, Searle’s theory on speech acts improved not only the speech 
acts categorization, but also the rules regarding the truth paradigm. The 
Austinian notion of felicity conditions was not enough to compensate for 
the insincerity and unfaithfulness of speakers toward their utterances.  
As Ambroise explained (2010:5), to perform a speech act is thus to 
generate a propositional content linked to an illocutionary force. But to 
generate an illocutionary force one has to follow several kinds of semantic 
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rules (corresponding to the Austinian felicity conditions): the preparatory 
conditions, the sincerity condition and the essential condition.  
 
Eckardt (2009:4) also states on her manuscript that one gets the feeling that 
these classes were more defined by phenotype than by the internal structure 
of speech acts, that the labels are more a convenient way to refer to 
homogeneous subtypes of speech acts than an ultimate categorization. 
 
Searle’s speech act analysis was based on logic assumptions; differently 
from Austin, he took into account the intention of the speaker. Ambroise 
(2010:7-9) listed the distinctions between Austin’s and Searle’s analyses 
of speech acts. He wrote that the first important aspect of Searle's account 
of speech act is the rigid distinction he introduces between the content and 
the force of it (something which was absent from Austin's analysis). As a 
second distinction, Ambroise stated that his analysis depends on an 
intentional or mentalist view which implies that the speaker's intentions – 
and their recognition – are essential to the realization of a speech act 
(whereas for Austin one cannot perform an act by making an appeal to 
intention).  
Finally, Ambroise points out that according to Searle, one can perform a 
speech act only if one manifests one's intention to do it by using such a 
sentence and if one manifests one's intention to undertake all the 
commitments of the speech act one intends to perform (2010:7).  
 
Can speech acts be taught? 
No matter the controversies on Speech Act Theory, such a term represents 
a basic concept in performing an action. There is available evidence in the 
works of various linguists (Blum-Kulka, 1982; Kasper, 1989; Rintell & 
Mitchell, 1989) for the importance of speech acts’ teaching in second 
language acquisition. One may raise the question of why should speech 
acts be taught. The main reason is language awareness.  
Nowadays, communicative approach is the most successful teaching 
method in SLA. The prime point of this method is naturally raising the 
communicative competence. However, the work in this approach is 
intermingled with the development of skills such as: pragmatic 
competence, grammar competence, social competence etc. pragmatic 
competence seems to play a crucial role in raising language awareness 
among FL students. Among the difficulties they encounter, it can be 
mentioned the lack of the proficiency to communicate fluently, the ability 
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to maintain an appropriate dialogue, the difficulty in communicating with 
native speakers. Apart the feature represented in the communicative 
approach, doing things with the language acquired is something to be taken 
into account. It means that students are able to perform speech acts like 
thanking, apologizing, complimenting, asking, etc. but this is easily said 
than done, because we encounter a lot of examples where students fail to 
do this. In most of the cases, the problem does not seem to the lack of 
lexicon, but the inability to adopt the lexicon, therefore it is not a question 
of speaking but of communicating and understanding each – others’ 
intentions.  As Thomas (1981:91) writes: I have given the term ‘pragmatic 
failure' to the inability to understand 'what is meant by what is said'. 
Kasper and Blum-Kulka (1993:12) discussed three major approaches to the 
study of pragmatic failure: 1) micro sociolinguistic analysis ascertains 
conversational style differences and identifies instances where such 
differences become problematic, but does not usually inquire into the 
origin of different conversational styles; 2) contrastive pragmatics, 
involving the crosscultural and cross-linguistic comparison of speech act 
realization patterns through identifying similarities and differences 
between the pairs or groups of languages studied. 3) interlanguage 
pragmatics can study the relationship between learners' prior knowledge 
and pragmatic performance. 
But according to Blum-Kulka (1993:7), other factors intervene: a lack of 
L2 pragmalinguistic sophistication, combined with negative transfer of 
sociopragmatic norms from LI or nonnative perceptions of L2 
sociopragmatic norms, or even purposeful loyalty to LI cultural patterns, 
may yield deviations from native use at high proficiency levels as well. 
One may purely ask if learning pragmatics is conscious or unconscious. 
According to Gleason & Perlmann (1985:102), unlike the acquisition of 
syntax, semantics, and even some sociolinguistic rules, when it comes to 
speaking politely adults do not leave it to the child to construct the rules on 
his or her own. Here, they take an active, even energetic part in directly 
instructing their children in the use of the various politeness devices. 
Schmidt (1993:36) explains that simple exposure to sociolinguistically 
appropriate input is unlikely to be sufficient for second language 
acquisition of pragmatic and discoursal knowledge because the linguistic 
realizations of pragmatic functions are sometimes opaque to language 
learners and because the relevant contextual factors to be noticed are likely 
to be defined differently or may be nonsalient for the learner.  
It is likely that there is a stronger relationship between motivation, 
acculturation and other affective factors in the development of pragmatic 
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and discoursal ability than in other aspects of language learning, such as 
syntax (Schmidt, 1983). Those who are concerned with establishing 
relationships with target language speakers are more likely to pay close 
attention to the pragmatic aspects of input and to struggle to understand 
than those who are not so motivated. 
As stated above, first pragmatic acquisition is unconscious and easily 
grasped along the child’s growth. Meanwhile second pragmatic acquisition 
becomes difficult due to the transfer from the first acquisition, being 
conscious of acts, and motivation.  
What skills can be included in pragmatic competence? Bialystok (1993:43) 
wrote that pragmatic competence entails a variety of abilities concerned 
with the use and interpretation of language in contexts. It includes speakers' 
ability to use language for different purposes—to request, to instruct, to 
effect change. It includes listeners' ability to get past the language and 
understand the speaker's real intentions, especially when these intentions 
are not directly conveyed in the forms—indirect requests, irony and 
sarcasm are some examples. It includes command of the rules by which 
utterances are strung together to create discourse. This apparently simple 
achievement to produce coherent speech itself has several components: 
turn taking, cooperation, cohesion.  
Due to the involvement of many linguistic issues, it seems that pragmatic 
competence should be part of proficient users of FL. Research reveals that 
even proficient users of FL might lack the pragmatic competence; what is 
more, this competence should be taught since the first stages of the 
acquisition of FL. 
Tannen (1984) lists eight levels of differences in the ways speakers signal 
what they mean: when to talk, what to say, pacing and pairing, intonation, 
formularity, indirectness, cohesion, and coherence; and these eight may 
lead to differential ways in which conversational partners tend to assess 
others' intentions as a basis for making their responses.  
As House (1986: 164) states this is due to the fact that indirectness lies at 
the heart of many if not most misresponses and misunderstandings in talk, 
and such alignment failures are of course much more likely to occur in talk 
between people from different cultural backgrounds, where indirectness 
and politeness conventions often diverge. 
 
Some case studies of Speech Acts 
Some acts, verbal and nonverbal, may count to the "face wants" of speaker 
or hearer and are considered "face-threatening acts". Brown and Levinson 
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(1987:13) categorize expressing thanks as a face-threatening act in which 
the speaker acknowledges a debt to the hearer, thus threatening the 
speaker's negative face.  
Eisenstein and Bodman (1993:65) listed the following points of view 
regarding gratitude in English language: Searle (1969) defines thanking 
positively as an illocutionary act performed by a speaker based on a past 
act performed by the hearer that was beneficial; Leech (1983) describes 
thanking as a convivial function whose goal of stating appreciation helps 
maintain a polite and friendly social atmosphere. 
Thanking as a speech act is not an easy task to be performed, due to the 
emotional attitude of S (preparatory rule) and the debtedness of the case 
(sincerity rule). The difficulty arises in cases when the thanking involves 
speakers of different cultures. Thomas (1983) notes that misunderstandings 
can arise not only from language limitations (pragmalinguistic failure) but 
also from inadequate utilization of social conventions and values in the 
target culture (sociopragmatic failure). Coulmas (1981) posits a useful 
distinction between thanks that entail indebtedness to the addressee and 
thanks that imply no indebtedness.  
Eisenstein and Bodman (1993:75-76) carried out four experiments on how 
native and non-native users of English express gratitude. They revealed 
some interesting facts. They state that it was evident that even advanced 
non--native learners of English had difficulty in expressing gratitude. They 
needed information such as what to say, how to express it. Many times they 
used simply Thank you instead of Thank you, you’re the best husband in 
the world. They were not able to prolong thanking with proper expressions. 
Eisenstein and Bodman (1993:75-76) recommend learners to observe the 
use of pragmatic functions in social interaction; it may be useful for them 
to compare English model to their own speech in order to enhance their 
awareness of the pragmalinguistic rules of English. 
In a nutshell, the analysis above is an evident case that speech acts can be 
taught. Thanking seems an easy utterance, but when conveyed into an act 
becomes complicated. The role of the teacher is important even in this 
apparently easy task. Through role-plays, students can be involved in 
practicing various original cases. The teacher should help them with their 
pragmatic transfer as well.  
 Borkin and Reinhart (1978:61) define apologies as compensatory action 
to an offense in the doing of which S was causally involved and which is 
costly to H. According to them, the function of "excuse me" is "a formula 
to remedy a past or immediately forthcoming breach of etiquette or other 
light infraction of a social rule". "I'm sorry," in their analysis, is used in a 
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wider range of contexts, especially "in remedial interchanges when a 
speaker's main concern is about a violation of another person's right or 
damage to another person's feelings". 
Bergman and Kasper (1993:90-100) analyzed the speech act of apologizing 
with British, German and Thai students. According to their results, students 
were more prone to explicitly express responsibility for the offense the 
closer the relationship between the offender and the offended person. They 
noticed pragmatic transfer especially with Thai students. Their findings 
were consistent with House’s observation (1987) that non-natives tend to 
do ‘too much of a good thing’. They stated that the non-natives 
oversupplied nonconventionalized speech act strategies.  
According to Olshtain and Weinbach (1993: 108), in the speech act of 
complaining, the speaker expresses displeasure or annoyance as a reaction 
to a past or ongoing action, the consequences of which are perceived by S 
as affecting her unfavorably.  
Olshtain and Weinbach (1993:120) confirmed that two general 
interlanguage features of speech act performance are length of utterance 
and variability. Learners at the intermediate to advanced level of second 
language acquisition tend to be verbose and use more words than native 
speakers, 
more than they themselves would use in their own language, in order to 
negotiate the intentions of their speech acts in the new language. They tend 
to use of intensifiers, softeners, number of moves, etc. can be seen from 
the consistently larger standard derivations exhibited by learners. 
Takahashi and Beebe (1993:153) uncovered a number of patterns in the 
speech act of correction analyzing it with American and Japanese students. 
First, they demonstrated that it is a typically American pattern to use a 
positive remark such as "That was a great account" before saying "but" and 
making a correction when speaking to a person of lower status. 
It is the Japanese using Japanese whose style shifting shows the greatest 
frequency in certain situations. Americans, in the same situations, show 
much more use of softeners, whether they are speaking to someone of 
higher or lower status. The style-shifting patterns are important because 
they are sociolinguistic evidence of a significant aspect of Japanese and 
American cultures.  
To sum up the assumptions made on the above case analyses on speech act 
realization, it can be  stated a list of important features: even advanced 
learners tend to have less control over the conventions of forms and means 
used by native speakers in the performance of linguistic action; differences 
between learners' and native speakers' sociopragmatic perceptions of 
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comparable speech events are systematically related to differences in their 
speech act performance; transfer at the pragmalinguistic and 
sociopragmatic level persists at higher levels of proficiency; learners 
produce more speech than native speakers when the task is less demanding 
on their control skills. 
Language proficiency, then, is considered in terms of the fit between the 
processing abilities of the learner and the task demands imposed by a 
specific language use situation. Where the two are congruent, learners will 
perform well; where the task demands are excessive relative to the learner's 
ability, learners will struggle. 
In a nutshell, nonnative speech act behavior can deviate from native 
behavior: in strategy selection, in utterance length, in the consideration of 
social and pragmatic features, in carrying out or opting out from 
performing a speech act, and in varying the degree of external and internal 
modification.  
Theories and definitions mentioned in the first part of this paper help us 
explain the empirical state of pragmatics and speech acts as a crucial 
moment of such science. The second part presented some concrete work 
done by various linguists on the speech acts of thanking, apologizing and 
complaining. Apart the interesting and valuable results revealed, the aim 
of this paper was to search if speech acts can be taught and if there is a 
reason to do so. In the end we can say that there is enough reason to teach 
students speech acts, in order to develop their pragmatic competence. It is 
also assumed that this can be done by using original material of English 
models and making use of role-play. We can also say that a non-native 
teacher can help them to compare and contrast the original models with 
those derived from their mother tongue. This can make them conscious of 
the pragmatic transfer phenomenon.  
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